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"MIGRATION WITH DIGNITY": 
TOWARDS A NEW ZEALAND 
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
DISPLACEMENT IN THE PACIFIC 
Harriet Farquhar* 
The impacts of climate change threaten to cause the displacement of millions of people worldwide 
by the middle of this century. Despite this looming crisis, international law provides insufficient 
protection to those who will be forced to migrate. In most cases, those who are displaced will fall 
outside of current protection frameworks. This article examines why this protection deficit should be 
of particular concern to New Zealand, and argues that there are significant incentives for New 
Zealand to develop a response to the issue of climate change displacement in the Pacific. The article 
concludes that in order to ensure Pacific peoples are able to migrate with dignity, migration 
schemes which are pre-emptive and voluntary should be put in place to facilitate migration flows. 
These should build upon New Zealand's current immigration framework, and include the extension 
of current permanent and temporary migration schemes, as well as the introduction of labour-
training migration schemes.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In its first Assessment Report in 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
warned that the "gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration".1 Since this 
first Report, a wealth of evidence has emerged to support this projection, and in its most recent and 
comprehensive assessment of climate change to date, the IPCC states categorically that the long-
term effects of climate change are expected to trigger large-scale population movements and 
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1  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Policymakers' Summary of the Potential Impacts of Climate 
Change: Report from Working Group II to IPCC (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990) at 20. 
30 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
 
significantly disrupt current migration flows.2 The world faces an impending displacement crisis. 
Increased frequency and severity of "climate events" such as storms, floods and droughts, as well as 
environmental degradation as a result of slow-onset "climate processes" such as sea-level rise, 
salination of agricultural land and water sources, desertification, and growing water scarcity, will 
lead to the displacement of millions of people.3 In fact, this has already begun. In 2012, an estimated 
32.4 million people were displaced by natural disasters – 98 per cent of which were climate and 
weather related events.4 Habitation in many parts of the world is becoming increasingly challenging. 
Attempts to quantify the expected number of people who will be displaced by climate change 
"are fraught with numerous methodological problems and caveats".5 All estimates are based on 
unknown variables and assumptions regarding economic and social conditions, population growth, 
temperature increase, the rate at which climate change impacts will be felt, as well as the level of 
investment in mitigation and adaptation measures.6 The prediction most often repeated is that by 
2050 between 200 and 250 million people will be displaced by climate change7 – approximately a 
five-fold increase over current numbers of documented refugees and internally displaced people.8 
Other estimates vary from between 25 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050.9 This leaves no 
doubt that while the numbers are uncertain, the phenomenon is not. The disruption to current 
patterns of human settlement and migration as a result of climate change will be widespread and 
severe. 
  
2  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change "Human Security" in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) 755 at 766 and 768–769. 
3  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of 
Solidarity: A Synthesis (2012) at 26.  
4  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council Global Estimates 2012: 
People Displaced by Disasters (May 2013) at 6. 
5  Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas "Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to 
Protect Climate Refugees" (2010) 10 Global Environmental Politics 60 at 67. 
6  Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas "Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol" 
Environment Magazine (Washington, November/December 2008) at 10; and Jane McAdam "Environmental 
Migration Governance" (University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, No 2009-1, 2009) 
at 2. 
7   International Organization for Migration Climate Change, Migration and Critical International Security 
Considerations (2011) at 9. 
8   As at 1 December 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 
there are 11.7 million refugees worldwide and 23.9 million internally displaced people: United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR Global Appeal 2015: Populations of Concern to UNHCR 
(December 2014).  
9   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 3, at 26. 
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Despite this looming crisis, international law provides insufficient protection to those who are 
displaced by climate change. In most cases, those who are forced to relocate will not fall within 
current protection frameworks. This gap at international law should be of particular concern to New 
Zealand, which is likely to face increasing migration demands from neighbouring Pacific Island 
countries and territories (PICTs) – nations which are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change and where levels of out-migration are likely to be high. This creates a considerable 
incentive for New Zealand to begin to examine possible responses to this issue. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the case for New Zealand action on the issue of climate 
change displacement in the Pacific and to present possible policy responses. It argues that in order to 
ensure "migration with dignity",10 a New Zealand approach to climate change displacement should 
focus on the implementation of pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes to increase mobility in 
the Pacific. This article concludes that these schemes should build upon New Zealand's existing 
immigration framework and include the expansion of permanent and temporary migration schemes, 
as well as the implementation of labour-training programmes aimed at Pacific peoples. 
The discussion will proceed first by outlining the current lack of protection at international law. 
Secondly, it will examine why this lack of protection is of particular concern to New Zealand, and 
the case for New Zealand action on the issue. It will then discuss the general shape which a New 
Zealand policy response should take. Finally, substantive policy recommendations will be provided.  
II THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The international legal regime grants only marginal protection to those who are displaced by 
climate change. This protection deficit has been the subject of considerable attention in legal 
scholarship,11 reports by international institutions and non-governmental organisations,12 and 
  
10  Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati "Relocation" Kiribati Climate Change <www.climate.gov.ki>. 
11  See for example Jane McAdam Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012); Biermann and Boas, above n 5; Maxine Burkett "In Search of Refuge: 
Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, and the Legal Frontier" Asia Pacific Issues (No 98, East West 
Centre, Honolulu, January 2011); Benoit Mayer "Constructing 'Climate Migration' as a Global Governance 
Issue: Essential Flaws in the Contemporary Literature" (2013) 9 McGill International Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 87; David Hodgkinson and others "'The Hour when the Ship Comes In': A 
Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change" (2010) 36 Mon LR 69; and Bonnie Docherty and 
Tyler Giannini "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees" 
(2009) 33 Harv Envtl L Rev 349. 
12  See for example International Organization for Migration, above n 7; United Nations Refugee Agency 
UNHCR, the Environment and Climate Change: An Overview (September 2014); United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Findings of a Study 
by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (September 2009); and Asian Development Bank Addressing Climate Change and 
Migration in Asia and the Pacific: Final Report (2012). 
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international and regional fora,13 and it is now well accepted that in most cases, those who are 
displaced by climate change will be unable to gain protection either under the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees 195114 ("the Refugee Convention") or complementary protection measures 
at international law. There is also no protection afforded under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change15 (UNFCCC) or at a regional level in the Pacific, and there is no 
established "responsibility to protect" in cases of environmental disaster.  
This position has been confirmed in the New Zealand context in recent judicial decisions by the 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT) in AF (Kiribati),16 upheld on appeal by both the High 
Court and Court of Appeal in Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (Teitiota),17 and in AD (Tuvalu).18 In Teitiota, the applicant was a citizen of 
Kiribati seeking protection in New Zealand on the basis of rising sea levels and environmental 
degradation, as a result of climate change in Kiribati.19 The IPT, High Court and Court of Appeal 
accepted the evidence presented by the applicant of the impacts of climate change on Kiribati – 
storm surges, extreme high spring tides, flooding of residential areas, raised floors of residences, 
depletion of fishing stocks, diminution of arable land, contamination of drinking water by salt water, 
sewage contamination of water tables and deterioration of the population's health.20 Nevertheless, 
the application was rejected in all three decisions. It was found that the applicant could gain neither 
refugee status nor protected person status in New Zealand. At the time of writing, the applicant had 
been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.21 In AD (Tuvalu), the IPT used its discretionary 
powers to overturn a deportation order in respect of a Tuvaluan family on humanitarian grounds. 
Although the application in this case was successful, AD (Tuvalu) demonstrates that while climate 
  
13  See for example United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – Conference of the Parties; 
and the Pacific Islands Forum. 
14  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (opened for signature 28 July 1951, entered 
into force 22 April 1954). 
15  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for signature 9 May 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). 
16  AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413. 
17  Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125, 
[2014] NZAR 162 [Teitiota NZHC]; and Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173, [2014] NZAR 688 [Teitiota NZCA]. 
18  AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370 and [2014] NZIPT 501371. 
19  Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [15]. 
20  At [18].  
21  "Climate refugee takes fight to Supreme Court" (1 February 2015) Radio New Zealand 
<www.radionz.co.nz>; and "Supreme Court – Case Summaries 2015" (9 February 2015) Courts of New 
Zealand <courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
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change may be a factor which will be considered in determining whether such an order should be 
overturned, the impacts of climate change alone will not be sufficient.    
A Refugee Status, Complementary Protection and Humanitarian 
Grounds 
It is clear that in most cases, those who are displaced by climate change will not be able to seek 
protection under the refugee or complementary protection frameworks. 
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 
A person is a refugee for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol,22 
who:23 
… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. 
There are a number of obstacles to people displaced by climate change gaining protection under 
the Refugee Convention. First, there is significant difficulty in characterising climate change as 
"persecution", which requires an element of human agency.24 Secondly, even if it were accepted 
that climate change was a form of "persecution", the indiscriminate nature of its impacts precludes 
this persecution occurring on the basis of one of the five Convention grounds: race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.25 Finally, many people 
displaced by climate change are also likely to still be within their home country when seeking 
protection.26 Therefore, while those who are displaced by climate change are not expressly 
precluded from gaining refugee status, an applicant would need to prove that an additional element 
constituting persecution on one of the Convention grounds was present.27  
The decisions of the IPT, High Court and Court of Appeal in Teitiota confirm this analysis, with 
the High Court decision being the most comprehensive. The Refugee Convention definition of a 
"refugee" is incorporated into domestic legislation under s 129(1) of the Immigration Act 2009, 
  
22  Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267 (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 
October 1967).  
23  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, above n 14, art 1A(2). 
24   McAdam, above n 11, at 43; McAdam, above n 6, at 12; and Robert McLeman "Climate Change Migration, 
Refugee Protection, and Adaptive Capacity-Building" (2008) 4 McGill International Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 1 at 14. 
25   McAdam, above n 11, at 44; and McAdam, above n 6, at 48. 
26  McAdam, above n 11, at 43; and McAdam, above n 6, at 13. 
27  McAdam, above n 11, at 44. 
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which requires that "a person must be recognised as a refugee … if he or she is a refugee within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention". The IPT and the courts found that while the term "refugee" 
may be used in the political realm to refer to those displaced by natural disasters or climate change, 
"it is abundantly clear that displacement of such refugees has not been caused by persecution" and, 
therefore, does not fall within the definition provided by the Refugee Convention.28 It was noted 
that while "persecution" is not defined in the Convention, New Zealand has adopted a "human 
rights" approach, necessitating "the sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of state protection".29 Human agency is, therefore, required. In addition, 
the High Court found that it could not be said that people displaced by climate change had "become 
refugees … on one of the five stipulated Refugee Convention grounds".30 
The High Court emphasised, however, that because there is "a complex inter-relationship 
between natural disasters, environmental degradation and human vulnerability", this does not mean 
that environmental degradation can never provide pathways into the Convention.31 It may, for 
example, where environmental degradation leads to armed conflict or where humanitarian relief 
becomes politicised, and persecution on one of the five Convention grounds becomes present.32 
Those displaced by reason of climate change alone, however, cannot obtain protection under the 
Refugee Convention.33 
2 Complementary protection 
Complementary protection, which precludes the non-refoulement of people who would be at 
risk of persecution, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and arbitrary 
threats to life, has also been raised as a possible ground of protection for those displaced by climate 
change.34 Again, there is no express preclusion stopping those who have been displaced by climate 
change from gaining protection under this ground. However, courts have been careful to delimit 
these terms, and according to current jurisprudence the impacts of climate change alone cannot be 
considered "cruel or degrading treatment".35 
  
28  Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [11]. 
29  At [8]. 
30  At [11]. 
31  At [27]. 
32  At [27]. 
33  At [26]. 
34   McAdam, above n 6, at 18. 
35  McAdam, above n 11, at 54; and Jane McAdam and Ben Saul "Displacement with Dignity: International 
Law and Policy Responses to Climate Change Migration and Security in Bangladesh" (University of New 
South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, 10/113, 2010) at 24. 
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Complementary protection is incorporated into New Zealand law under the Immigration Act as 
a form of protection supplementary to refugee status – "protected person status".36 Section 130 
requires a person to be recognised as a protected person under the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment37 ("the Torture Convention") where 
the applicant would be "in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand".38 
Section 131 requires that someone be recognised as a protected person under arts 6 and 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)39 where there are substantial grounds 
to believe they would be in danger of "being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel 
treatment" if deported.40  
Section 130 is unlikely to provide a ground of protection for those displaced by climate 
change.41 The definition of "torture" requires instigation, consent or acquiescence by a public 
official.42 In Teitiota, however, it was considered whether the applicant could gain protection under 
s 131. The IPT found that protection on the basis of the arbitrary deprivation of life requires an act 
or omission of the state which threatens an imminent violation of the right.43 The Tribunal 
recognised that states have positive obligations to protect the right to life from known environmental 
hazards, and that a failure to do so may, in principle, constitute an omission.44 However, it was 
found that the Kiribati Government had fulfilled these obligations by playing an active role in 
making known the threats posed to its State by climate change.45 A subsequent IPT decision has 
confirmed that to expect PICT governments to mitigate the underlying drivers of climate change, 
and to equate such an inability with a failure of state protection, would place "an impossible burden 
on the state".46 It was also confirmed that any threat to life as a result of climate change did not meet 
  
36  Doug Tennent and Katy Armstrong Immigration and Refugee Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2013) at 21. 
37  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 
85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).  
38  Immigration Act 2009, s 130(1). 
39  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
40  Immigration Act 2009, s 131(1). 
41  AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [78]. 
42  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, above n 37, 
art 1; and Tennent and Armstrong, above n 36, at 329. 
43  AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [85] and [89]. 
44  At [87]. 
45  At [88]. 
46  AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517 and [2014] NZIPT 800520 at [75]. 
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the required threshold to establish imminence.47 The applicant was also unable to show that there 
was a qualifying act by the Kiribati Government which would amount to "cruel treatment".48 
Therefore, the IPT, High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Teitiota confirm that the 
current position in the New Zealand context is that without an added element of human agency, 
neither refugee nor complementary protection will extend to those who are forced to relocate as a 
result of climate change.  
3 Humanitarian grounds 
Additional protection on humanitarian grounds exists within the New Zealand legal framework. 
Pursuant to s 207 of the Immigration Act, the IPT has the discretionary power to overturn a decision 
for deportation where the applicant does not meet the requirements for refugee or protected person 
status, but there are "exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust 
or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported".49 The potential of this ground to provide 
protection to those displaced by climate change has been significantly overstated in recent media 
coverage of the IPT decision in AD (Tuvalu), which heralded the case in which a Tuvaluan family 
successfully appealed a decision for their deportation on humanitarian grounds as "the first legal 
recognition of 'climate refugees'".50 This characterisation is however "wildly off the mark".51 While 
climate change was one of the matters taken into account by the IPT when considering whether 
humanitarian circumstances existed,52 the finding of such circumstances was based for the most part 
on the fact that deportation in this case would have amounted to an "unusually significant disruption 
to a dense network of family relationships".53 It should also be noted that the applicants brought 
another case for refugee and protected person status on the basis of the impacts of climate change. 
This claim was rejected in AC (Tuvalu), a decision confirming the reasoning in Teitiota.54 
AD (Tuvalu) by no means marks the discovery of a new avenue for protection for those 
displaced by climate change. Even though evidence of the impacts of climate change may be 
  
47  AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [91]. 
48  At [95]. 
49  Jane McAdam "No 'Climate Refugees' in New Zealand" (13 August 2014) Planet Policy: Brookings 
Institution <www.brookings.edu>. 
50  McAdam, above n 49; and Amy Maas "Tuvalu climate change family win NZ residency appeal" The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 3 August 2014). 
51  Vernon Rive "'Climate refugees' revisited: a closer look at the Tuvalu decision" (14 August 2014) Vernon 
Rive: Environmental Barrister <www.vernonrive.co.nz>. 
52  AD (Tuvalu), above n 18, at [30]. 
53  At [31]. 
54  AC (Tuvalu), above n 46.  
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considered as part of the inquiry into whether humanitarian circumstances exist,55 humanitarian 
grounds will only provide protection in unique cases where the stringent test of "exceptional 
circumstances" is satisfied.56 Generally, climate change alone will not be enough to reach this 
threshold.57 As such, Vernon Rive has noted that the decision does not "provide an open ticket for 
people from all the places that are impacted by climate change".58 If anything, it serves to highlight 
the limits of current legal protection.59 
B United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
There are also no general obligations on states at international law with regard to climate change 
displacement. Under the UNFCCC, developed countries are committed to providing assistance to 
developing countries "in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects [of climate change]".60 
While migration is considered an adaptation measure, this broad commitment is not reinforced by 
any obligations specifically concerned with migration.61 
C Responsibility to Protect 
It has also been argued that the international community may be subject to an emerging 
"responsibility to protect" in relation to those who are displaced by natural disasters, such as climate 
change, where their own governments are unable or unwilling to assist them.62 However, while the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's 2001 Report identified 
"overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes" as a possible ground upon which a 
responsibility to protect might arise,63 at the 2005 World Summit the scope of the responsibility was 
limited to situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.64 
Therefore, although it is possible that a responsibility might arise where the impacts of climate 
  
55  AD (Tuvalu), above n 18, at [32]. 
56  Rive, above n 51. 
57  Rive, above n 51. 
58  Maas, above n 50. 
59  McAdam, above n 49. 
60  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 15, art 4(4). 
61  McLeman, above n 24, at 15. 
62  Tyra Saecho "Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clarity" (2007) 32 
Brooklyn J Int'l L 663. 
63  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (December 
2001) at 33. 
64  2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138]. 
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change led to a situation in which such crimes are committed,65 it is difficult to speak of any 
existing or emerging responsibility towards those displaced by climate change at the current time. 
D Regional Instruments in the Pacific 
Finally, there are no obligations on states at a regional level in the Pacific which address 
protection of people displaced by climate change. In 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum signed the 
Niue Declaration in which nations undertook to "encourage the Pacific's Development Partners to 
increase their technical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation 
and, if necessary, relocation".66 This commitment, however, was non-binding and no specific 
obligations were agreed upon. Subsequently, in the Majuro Declaration of September 2013, the 
reference to "relocation" was omitted.67 
It is thus clear that those who are displaced by climate change "fall through the cracks of 
international refugee and immigration policy".68 
III CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT IN THE PACIFIC 
REGION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
The issue of the protection deficit at international law for those displaced by climate change is a 
global one. This article argues, however, that it should be of particular concern to New Zealand as a 
developed nation in the Pacific – a region often considered "climate change ground zero".69 
A Climate Change Displacement in the Pacific 
PICTs are on the climate change front line. As low-lying states, they are vulnerable to sea level 
rise and the increased frequency of extreme sea-level events such as storm surges.70 Erosion and 
flooding pose a significant threat to PICTS, where most human communities and infrastructure are 
  
65  Stuart Ford "Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against Humanity? The 
Responsibility to Protect and Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis" 
(2010) 38 Denv J Int'l L & Pol'y 227. 
66  Pacific Islands Forum "Forum Leaders endorse the Niue Declaration on Climate Change" (press release, 26 
August 2008). 
67  Pacific Islands Forum "Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership" (adopted 5 September 2013, Majuro); 
and Vernon Rive "Safe Harbours, Closed Borders? New Zealand Legal and Policy Responses to Climate 
Displacement in the South Pacific" (paper presented to the 2013 IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 
Annual Colloquium, Waikato University, June 2013) at 5. 
68  International Organization for Migration Migration and Climate Change (2008) at 10. 
69   McAdam, above n 6, at 2. 
70  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change "Small Islands" in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability – Part B: Regional Aspect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) 1613 at 1619. 
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located in coastal zones and there are limited internal relocation opportunities.71 Salt-water 
intrusions threaten the contamination of fresh water sources72 and the salination of arable soil, 
which reduces agricultural productivity – the base of PICT economies.73 Furthermore, increased 
ocean acidity leads to the degradation of coral reefs, which play a significant role in reducing 
foreshore erosion and are critical to the subsistence fisheries and tourism industries.74 While much 
of the discussion of the risks faced by PICTs has focused on that of inundation, the more immediate 
threat is these slow-onset processes, which will make the land increasingly unsustainable and 
eventually uninhabitable, "long before complete inundation".75 At greatest risk are atolls such as 
Kiribati, Tokelau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, which are low-lying, with no soils, no surface 
water, low levels of terrestrial biodiversity, and fragile groundwater systems.76 
These physical vulnerabilities are further exacerbated by pre-existing development challenges 
faced by PICTs which make adaptation to changing conditions more difficult. The Stern Review 
recognised that "climate change … will have a disproportionately harmful effect on developing 
countries"77 as a result of "exposure to an already fragile environment, an economic structure that is 
highly sensitive to an adverse and changing climate, and low incomes [constraining] their ability to 
adapt".78 This is especially true in the case of the Pacific Islands, which are "amongst the most aid-
dependent and least progressive developing nations in the world".79 The Pacific faces challenges 
including poverty, low GDP, unemployment, pollution, high population growth and over-population 
in urban areas.80 Kiribati's Solicitor-General David Lambourne has noted that "climate change 
  
71  At 1618. 
72  At 1622; and John Campbell "Climate Change Migration in the Pacific" (2014) 26 The Contemporary 
Pacific 1 at 3. 
73  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 70, at 1632; and Campbell, above n 72, at 3. 
74  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 70, at 1621. 
75  Maxine Burkett, above n 11, at 4 and 5; McAdam, above n 6, at 16; and Kelly Wyett "Escaping a Rising 
Tide: Sea Level Rise and Migration in Kiribati" (2014) 1 Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 171 at 172. 
76  Campbell, above n 72, at 4. 
77  Nicholas Stern The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 92. 
78  At 93. 
79  Stacey Kwant "The Potential of Pacific Seasonal Workers to Meet New Zealand and Australia's 
Development Goals for the Pacific Islands" (MA Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012) at 99. 
80  Jane McAdam "Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the 
Answer" (2011) 23 IJRL 2 at 4; and Wyett, above n 75, at 174. 
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overlays [these] pre-existing pressures … which means that it may provide a 'tipping point' that 
would not have been reached in its absence".81 
It is clear that by mid-century, as a result of these vulnerabilities, there will be a large number of 
people in the Pacific displaced by climate change. While there has been limited work done on 
quantifying this movement, scenarios developed by University of Waikato researcher John 
Campbell estimate that between 665,000 and 1.7 million individuals in the Pacific will migrate or be 
displaced by 2050.82 One can also get a sense of the scale of the potential migration flows when 
considering that it is estimated that by 2050 there will be 320,000 people living on Pacific Island 
atolls – those areas which are most vulnerable to climate change and from which many people are 
likely to be displaced.83 Numbers likely to be displaced from non-atoll locations will also be 
significant, and could surpass those from atolls.84 While more research is needed to quantify this 
movement, it is clear that climate change has the potential to cause mass population movements in 
the Pacific.85 
B An Imperative for New Zealand Action 
It seems clear that New Zealand is under no legal obligation to respond to climate change 
displacement in the Pacific. Yet, as one of the developed nations in the region, this impending crisis 
and the lack of any international response should be of particular concern. There are significant 
incentives for New Zealand to act.  
First, there is a well-documented moral argument for developed nations with high per capita 
emissions, such as New Zealand, to support the people of developing nations who will suffer 
disproportionately compared to their contribution to climate change.86 PICTs are responsible for 
only an estimated 0.3 per cent of global emissions87 and only 1.84 per cent of Oceania's emissions 
(the bulk coming from Australia and New Zealand),88 but these nations will experience the impacts 
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of climate change most severely. Thus, there is a "unique and compelling moral element to [these] 
migrants' situation",89 and a strong moral imperative for a nation with the stated goal of making "its 
mark as a global citizen" to provide for their protection.90 
There is also a significant practical incentive for New Zealand to act. The impacts of climate 
change will increasingly be felt in the Pacific, and as they grow more acute, New Zealand will face 
increasing pressure for migration opportunities from its vulnerable PICT neighbours. A number of 
Pacific leaders have identified New Zealand as a country from whom assistance is sought in 
addressing the challenges of climate change.91 New Zealand has a long history of playing an 
important role in the Pacific, providing support to smaller island states and establishing strong 
cultural, social and political ties.92 There are also significant numbers of Pacific people already 
settled in New Zealand who retain strong ties to their countries of origin, and whose pre-established 
communities offer support for future migrants.93 New Zealand is seen as a natural migration 
destination, and it would "be naïve … to expect anything other than a significant increase in the 
numbers of Pacific residents seeking refuge in … New Zealand".94 New Zealand will, whether by 
choice or not, be on the front line in addressing climate change displacement in the Pacific.  
To withhold action is to wait for a humanitarian crisis to occur; a situation which would require 
significantly higher levels of outward migration, with greater urgency, higher costs and less scope 
for planning.95 It would also give rise to a serious security threat in the region. As conditions 
become more challenging and resources more scarce, climate change has "the potential to … lead to 
considerable instability, disruption and conflict" in the Pacific.96 Therefore, while international law 
does not provide adequate protection to those who will be displaced, "we cannot continue to ignore 
environmental refugees simply because there is no institutionalised mode of dealing with them".97 
Instead, beginning to address this issue now will lessen the impact and likelihood of a humanitarian 
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crisis in the Pacific. The key question, therefore, is what shape a New Zealand policy response 
should take.  
IV A NEW ZEALAND POLICY RESPONSE 
It is critical that any response to climate change displacement in the Pacific not only provides 
the opportunity for Pacific peoples to migrate, but that such a response ensures "migration with 
dignity".98 Much of the literature examining climate change displacement has focused on "remedial 
protection responses", instruments which provide protection once people have been displaced, such 
as the extension of refugee status and complementary protection measures, at either the international 
or domestic level.99 Such measures, however, are designed to respond only once a humanitarian 
crisis has occurred and fail to address the scope that exists for pre-emptive action, which may help 
to avoid a migration crisis occurring, or lessen its impact.  
The slow onset nature of climate change impacts provides an opportunity which does not 
usually exist in other instances of mass displacement to "plan for responses, rather than [rely] on 
remedial instruments in the case of spontaneous and desperate flight".100 There will be significant 
benefits for both origin and destination communities if the migration of increasing numbers of 
people from the Pacific can be "managed progressively through a co-ordinated approach" in which 
Pacific peoples make their own decisions about movement, in their own time.101 Kiribati President, 
Anote Tong, has emphasised:102   
… the relocation of the 100,000 people of Kiribati … cannot be done overnight. It requires long term 
forward planning and the sooner we act, the less stressful and the less painful it [will] be for all 
concerned.  
Schemes which work on the model of pre-emptive, voluntary migration have a much higher 
chance of success than delaying action until the mass resettlement of communities becomes the only 
option.103  
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A Migration as a Form of Adaptation 
Pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes challenge the assumption that migration represents a 
failure of adaptation and a measure of last resort.104 In fact, migration can be an important part of an 
"integrated adaptation strategy" for communities who must adjust to changing environmental 
conditions.105 Migration can contribute positively to adaptation by building financial, social and 
human capital, improving the lives of migrants and their home communities.106  
Migrants who relocate under pre-emptive, voluntary schemes have a far greater chance of 
successfully settling in New Zealand than forced migrants. They will face lower costs and a lower 
risk of social dislocation than if they are forced to migrate in an emergency situation.107 The gradual 
settlement of Pacific peoples in New Zealand in a slow but sustained process will also allow 
communities to become established, and then facilitate future migration.108  
Pre-emptive, voluntary migration will be beneficial to the communities of origin, helping them 
to adapt to climate change. Communities receive significant financial benefits through the receipt of 
remittances – money sent back to home communities by migrants.109 Remittances are already an 
important source of finance for development in the Pacific, for example amounting to 15 per cent of 
GDP in Kiribati and 40 per cent in Tonga.110 Remittances ensure access to basic needs across 
seasons and during livelihood shocks, and provide added capital to the local economy, which helps 
communities to adapt.111 Secondly, communities of origin receive benefits when migrants return 
home temporarily, bringing with them new skills and knowledge.112 Importantly, pre-emptive 
migration schemes also relieve population pressures and demands for resources in sending 
  
104  Asian Development Bank, above n 12, at 46; and Jon Barnett and Natasha Chamberlain "Migration as 
Climate Change Adaptation: Implications for the Pacific" in Bruce Burson (ed) Climate Change and 
Migration: South Pacific Perspectives (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2010) 51 at 57. 
105  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 2, at 770; and Campbell, above n 72, at 7. 
106  Jon Barnett and Michael Webber "Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits" in Jane McAdam 
(ed) Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 37 
at 38; and Barnett and Chamberlain, above n 104, at 52. 
107  Asian Development Bank, above n 12, at 52. 
108  Campbell, above n 82, at 42. 
109  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 2, at 771; and McAdam, above n 80, at 20. 
110  Barnett and Chamberlain, above n 104, at 55. 
111  At 44. 
112  At 45. 
44 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
 
countries, and this significantly increases adaptive capacity113 allowing those who wish to remain to 
do so for longer.114  
There are also clear benefits to New Zealand in implementing pre-emptive, voluntary migration 
schemes. While the dominant discourse in developed nations around migrants is often negative, 
there is a significant body of research to show that migrants who move voluntarily are generally 
hard-working, seeking to maximise incomes, build a life for themselves and send money back to 
relatives at home.115 From a New Zealand perspective, pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes 
allow a greater degree of control over the process of migration. Schemes can be developed which 
will have dual benefits, both for sending communities and New Zealand: there are lower costs and 
less infrastructure is required than in a situation of mass relocation.116  
B The Challenges of Pre-emptive Migration Schemes 
In order for implementation to be successful however, the challenges inherent in such schemes 
must be addressed. 
For many of those who choose to relocate to New Zealand, it is likely that migration will be a 
challenging process. Climate migrants will generally be moving from rural and developing 
communities, with limited financial resources. They are likely to face challenges in integrating into 
their new communities.117 There is a risk that migrants could be subject to discrimination and that 
they may be locked into low-wage jobs as a result of low skill levels, or of having skills which are 
not suited to the New Zealand job market.118 This is of particular concern, not only because these 
factors may affect migrants' abilities to settle and contribute to New Zealand society, but also 
because if migrants are unable to settle successfully, this may engage New Zealand's legal 
responsibilities on the international plane. In agreeing to settle climate migrants, New Zealand's 
obligations are not simply limited to ensuring their "survival and physical security", but also to 
upholding their civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.119 If migrants do 
not receive adequate support, this may impair their enjoyment of their rights as minority groups120 
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to enjoy and take part in cultural life,121 as well as their rights to work, to education and to an 
adequate standard of living.122 In order to comply with these positive obligations123 and to ensure 
successful settlement of migrants, New Zealand may need to provide extra support at an individual 
level, for example assistance with job-seeking, finding housing and developing language skills to 
help migrants to adjust to life in New Zealand,124 and at a community level to facilitate the 
continuance of social practices.125 
Communities of origin also face risks with the introduction of migration schemes, primarily the 
loss of human capital, especially because those who migrate are likely to be more skilled than those 
who remain. Where the movements of people are large, migration may increase vulnerability to 
climate change.126 For example since the early 1970s, there has been large-scale migration from 
Niue, which is in free association with New Zealand (meaning that all Niueans are New Zealand 
citizens), to the extent that now 80 per cent of the Niuean-born population live in New Zealand.127 
This has reduced population and resource pressures in Niue, but it has also accentuated market 
distortions, increased labour demands, increased disputes over land and raised significant concerns 
about Niue's ability to maintain its cultural identity.128 To ensure migration schemes have adaptive 
benefits for communities of origin, they must not counter the efforts of other adaptation 
programmes. It is important to try and avoid a "brain drain" with the out-migration of skilled 
community members. This might involve staggering movement, diversifying the nature of the 
schemes, facilitating temporary migration, encouraging the temporary return of permanent migrants 
and encouraging migration from communities not currently benefiting from remittances.129 New 
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Zealand must also encourage the practice of remittance payments to ensure maximum financial 
benefit for PICT communities from migration, for example by capping fees to reduce the costs of 
transfers.130 
The implementation of migration schemes in response to climate change will also have costs for 
New Zealand, with an increased burden on finances and infrastructure. From a New Zealand 
perspective, a balance must be reached between trying to minimise the costs of such schemes, while 
also ensuring that once a commitment is made to implementation, there is sufficient investment to 
ensure they are successful. Costs will be reduced in the short term by encouraging migration of 
skilled migrants and migrants who are able to work or be trained in areas of skill shortage in New 
Zealand. Long-term costs will be reduced by providing the adequate support to migrants to ensure 
they are able to settle successfully in New Zealand.  
V POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This article recommends that a New Zealand approach to addressing climate change 
displacement in the Pacific should involve the implementation of a range of voluntary, pre-emptive 
migration schemes, which facilitate mobility in the region for a diverse range of people, while 
balancing the interests of migrants, PICT communities and New Zealand. These schemes should 
build upon the pre-existing immigration framework, and include the expansion of permanent and 
temporary migration schemes, and the implementation of labour-training programmes. 
A Permanent Migration Schemes 
One focus of New Zealand policy reform should be on increasing the ability of PICT citizens to 
gain residency in New Zealand through targeted schemes.  
1 Current scheme – the Pacific Access Category 
New Zealand is unique in already having in place a scheme for permanent migration to New 
Zealand directed specifically at PICTs – the Pacific Access Category (PAC). The PAC provides for 
residency for 75 people from Kiribati, 75 from Tuvalu and 250 from Tonga annually.131 The 
scheme was introduced in 2002, and is designed to grant residency to Pacific people who would 
otherwise not meet the regular requirements132 and as a means of assisting these smaller nations.133 
The scheme replaced the seasonal work arrangements previously in place with Tuvalu and 
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Kiribati.134 Applicants are drawn from a ballot and invited to apply for residence. In order to meet 
conditions for residence, it must be shown that they:135 
(a) are aged between 18 and 45; 
(b) have an offer of employment in New Zealand;136  
(c) meet minimum English language requirements; and 
(d) meet health and character requirements for New Zealand residence applications. 
The PAC is a traditional migration programme, but in some respects it is already well suited 
towards being a tool for climate change migration. It is aimed specifically at Pacific Island countries 
which are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and provides a migration pathway for people 
who do not meet the regular requirements for residency.137 The ballot process means that all 
migrants have an equal chance of being invited to apply for residence.138 Further reform of the 
scheme would, however, improve its utility as a climate change migration tool. The scheme exists 
under the Immigration New Zealand Operational Manual (the INZ Operational Manual),139 which 
constitutes "immigration instructions" for the purposes of the Immigration Act,140 and as such, the 
terms of the scheme can be altered upon certification of the Minister.141 Legislative change is not 
required for the necessary reforms to be made. 
2 Options for reform 
The first focus for reform of the PAC should be on incrementally increasing quota numbers and 
expanding the scheme to other vulnerable PICTs. Quota numbers under the scheme are small. 
Ongoing population growth in islands such as Kiribati and Tuvalu is going to increase the number 
of people who may require relocation, and slowing or reversing this population growth will require 
significant increases in out-migration.142 In the case of Tuvalu, because of its small population 
(10,000), these numbers are relatively low compared to New Zealand's overall residency 
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programme. However, in the case of Kiribati (population 100,000), "reversing population growth … 
will be impossible without major increases in out-migration".143 Increased quotas under the PAC 
would be one way of facilitating increased flows of migrants from these vulnerable PICTs.  
A second focus for reform should be increased job-seeker support so that those who are selected 
under the ballot are able to take up their invitations for residency. There is some evidence that those 
who have been selected under the scheme have had difficulty finding appropriate employment.144 
While there are already some supports in place for those who are selected under the ballot (for 
example employment agents in New Zealand who pass on CVs of applicants to prospective New 
Zealand employers, and the ability to travel to New Zealand on a visitor visa to search for a job),145 
more could be done to ensure those selected in the ballot are eligible for residence. This could 
include funding recruitment agents to actively seek out job opportunities for migrants who are 
unable to find their own employment. It could also include the provision of financial support to help 
those who need to travel to New Zealand on a visitor visa to search for work.  
The scheme's regulatory framework should also be reconsidered. While the scheme's basis in the 
INZ Operational Manual means that reform of the scheme can be more easily achieved than if 
parliamentary support was required, it also leaves the PAC, as a unilateral scheme without a 
legislative basis, vulnerable to abolition or limitation. In order to better secure this migration 
pathway for climate change migrants, it may be that the scheme itself should be given a legislative 
basis, or given the status of international legal obligation in the form of bilateral or plurilateral 
agreements with the Pacific countries of origin. 
3 Limitations of reform 
A key limitation of the scheme, however, is that migration under PAC will not be possible for a 
large portion of PICT populations who are unskilled, and will not meet the age and language 
requirements, or will be unable to find a job in New Zealand146 – the very people who are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.147 Therefore, there are significant equity concerns 
about the scheme. The possibility for reform in this area, however, is likely to be limited. The 
removal of the requirements under the scheme would be unlikely to be politically viable, as this 
would involve far greater cost for New Zealand. Migrants arriving without the necessary skills to 
adjust to life in New Zealand would require far greater settlement support, more akin to that 
provided to refugees. 
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Another concern about the expansion of the PAC is that in offering permanent migration to 
PICT community members who are more skilled, and, therefore, likely to play an important part in a 
community's ability to adapt to changing environmental conditions, there is a risk of reducing the 
adaptive capacity of communities.148 Implementation, therefore, must balance New Zealand's 
interest in receiving migrants of a particular skill level, and the interests of PICTs in retaining 
human capital. This will be best achieved by ensuring that increased quota numbers do not exceed a 
level which is sustainable in terms of communities' adaptive capacities. Migration beyond this level 
should be facilitated through temporary migration schemes, which guarantee the return of migrants 
with improved skill sets. Ensuring that communities receive the financial and social benefits of 
permanent out-migration will also help to mitigate any possible negative effects of the loss of 
human capital. This can be achieved by better facilitating remittance payments and encouraging 
permanent migrants to return home temporarily, so that they can contribute their new knowledge 
and skills and extend the social network of PICT communities.149 
B Temporary Labour Migration Schemes 
A second strategy for facilitating migration between New Zealand and PICTs is to increase 
access to temporary migration. 
1 Current scheme – the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme 
New Zealand introduced the Recognised Seasonal Employer ("RSE") Scheme in 2007. The 
Scheme grants migrants temporary visas to work in the horticulture and viticulture industries. 
Preference is given to workers from Pacific Islands Forum countries, and workers are granted seven-
month visas (nine months for those from Kiribati and Tuvalu), and they may return if they are 
recruited again.150 To gain entry under the scheme, migrants must show that they have a job offer 
from an approved employer.151 The scheme was designed to solve the shortage of seasonal labour 
workers in these industries and boost productivity, as well as benefiting temporary workers and their 
country of origin. It is designed to contribute to New Zealand's goals in the Pacific region regarding 
"economic development, regional integration and stability".152 
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The RSE scheme has been deemed to be "best-practice"153 and in many ways is a suitable 
climate change migration tool. The scheme provides the opportunity for migration to a wider group 
of people than those included under the PAC scheme, as it is targeted at unskilled workers. Migrants 
under the scheme are able to work temporarily abroad, earn an income, up-skill and then return 
home.154 This allows them to remain in their communities for longer than might otherwise have 
been possible, and enhances the adaptive capacity of communities, as there is no permanent loss of 
human capital. Migrants will return to their communities of origin, bringing with them new skill sets 
and financial resources. Indeed, participation in the scheme has raised incomes in both Tonga and 
Vanuatu, allowed households to accumulate more assets and increased subjective standards of 
living.155 The time spent by migrants in New Zealand also allows them to develop networks, 
especially with employers, which may provide opportunities for permanent migration in the future, 
for example under the PAC. Further reform of the scheme would however be desirable. As with the 
PAC, the RSE scheme exists under the INZ Operational Manual, meaning changes can be made by 
the minister without the need for legislative reform.156 
2 Options for reform 
In the first instance the focus of reform should be on increasing the number of visas on offer. 
Currently, the number of visas under the scheme is capped at 9,000.157 The horticulture and 
viticulture industry has been lobbying for increases to the cap, with industry groups saying that the 
scheme underpins the growth in the sector.158 Moreover, the horticulture and viticulture industry is 
forecasting employment growth of over 3,000 jobs in the next financial year,159 and a recent paper 
by the Ministry of Primary Industries has predicted an extra 7,800 workers will be needed by 
2025.160 This suggests the capacity for increased quotas. Similar schemes could also be introduced 
in other growth industries, using the model of the RSE scheme, to increase the temporary migration 
flow from PICTs.  
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Secondly, there is the capacity for Immigration New Zealand ("INZ") to set up better linkages 
between the RSE and PAC schemes.161 There are some employers under the RSE scheme who have 
looked to support their workers who subsequently get balloted under the PAC by providing them 
with offers for continuing employment in the horticulture industry, in jobs where their skills are 
needed through the year.162 This enables migrants to experience life in New Zealand before 
applying for permanent residency, and helps them meet the PAC employment requirements. From a 
New Zealand perspective, it is also beneficial to have migrants applying for permanent migration 
who have already spent time in New Zealand, are more familiar with the culture and are likely 
already to have support networks in New Zealand. Immigration New Zealand could play an active 
role in encouraging these links.163 This could involve ensuring that all RSE employers and 
employees are aware of, and have access to, information about the PAC, and seeking out employers 
under the RSE scheme who may have capacity to take on workers not only seasonally, but in the 
long term also. Additionally, a separate PAC access category could be created under the INZ 
Operational Manual for those who are already in New Zealand or have already worked in New 
Zealand temporarily to increase their chance of being selected in the ballot.  
As with the PAC, because the RSE scheme exists under the INZ Operational Manual, there may 
be an interest in achieving greater protection for this pathway by giving it a legislative basis or 
establishing its terms through international agreement. However, this may be less viable than in the 
case of the PAC. Because the scheme is designed to respond to labour shortages, it may be harder to 
predict the future capacity of the scheme, and it is likely the Government would want to retain 
greater control of its terms. 
3 Limitations of reform 
One concern with the expansion of such a scheme is that it does not deal with long-term 
migration pressures. In a strict sense this is true. However, relocation is "not simply a material 
infrastructure process … it is also a social process".164 Many people do not want to migrate, or may 
not have the resources to do so permanently.165 Temporary schemes offer these people another tool 
for in-situ adaptation. Secondly, temporary schemes allow greater migration flows while having less 
of a "brain drain" effect than permanent migration schemes, which helps to ensure that out-
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migration does not counteract other adaptive benefits.166 Finally, it is also clear that temporary 
schemes such as this do help to address long-term migration concerns. They allow migrants to 
develop networks and adapt to the culture in New Zealand, making future permanent migration a 
greater possibility.167 
Another potential criticism of expansion of the scheme is that while the RSE is presented as 
being a "triple-win", there is also an argument that the biggest beneficiary is New Zealand, while 
migrants are locked into a low-wage, manual strata of the economy. While the scheme was shown to 
increase household incomes in PICTs, migrants were earning relatively low wages. The median 
after-tax income in New Zealand reported by seasonal migrants surveyed in a 2010 study was 
$12,000.168 After accounting for costs, Tongan workers on average remitted or brought back with 
them $5,500.169 A similar critique could be made of the PAC scheme: that without greater social, 
economic and educative support within these programmes, Pacific peoples will face a life with little 
opportunity for growth and few choices in New Zealand.  
C Labour-Training Migration Pathways 
This article's final policy recommendation is the introduction of labour-training schemes, in 
which migrants are trained and employed in skilled occupations in shortage in New Zealand.   
1 The Australian model – Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative 
A model for this exists in Queensland. The Australian Government introduced the "Kiribati 
Australia Nursing Initiative" (KANI) in 2006, a programme funded through the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID).170 Through the initiative, which is designed to address 
climate change imperatives, rapid population growth and youth unemployment, and diversify the 
remittance base, i-Kiribati school graduates are awarded scholarships to train as nurses at Griffith 
University, Brisbane.171 Once their training is complete, they are able to seek employment in 
Australia, return to Kiribati, or use their skills to qualify for skilled migration in other countries.172 
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Where students choose to remain and work in Australia, there is no automatic granting of residency 
or citizenship; instead they must apply for an employer-sponsored visa.173 
The 2013 Independent Review of the KANI described it as an "innovative model for 'doing 
development' in small, environmentally fragile Pacific island countries", and found that it "remains 
strongly relevant to the sustainable development needs of Kiribati and to its adaptation policy of 
'migration with dignity' to address serious climate change imperatives".174 The review did note, 
however, that the costs of the scheme were relatively high for the developmental benefits.175  
2 New Zealand implementation 
New Zealand could introduce a similar scheme under the INZ Operational Manual, aimed at 
vulnerable PICTs such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, and designed to fill skill shortages in New Zealand. 
Long-term skill shortages identified by INZ which could be suitable for inclusion in such schemes 
include nursing, physiotherapy, radiography, agriculture and forestry, and surveying.176 The scheme 
would likely be most effective if it was implemented in areas such as nursing where there is also a 
skill shortage in PICTs.177 
The implementation of a labour-training scheme would provide another migration pathway and 
would diversify the range of people in PICTs for whom migration is available as an adaptive 
response. Migration under a labour-training scheme avoids concerns about locking migrants into 
low-wage jobs, and plays an active role in up-skilling participants. It would result in a 
diversification of the source of remittances being sent back to their home countries, which helps to 
ensure that there is a continual flow of remittances back to PICTs, even if there are livelihood 
shocks in New Zealand. It is also likely that the remittances paid would be higher under such a 
scheme, as migrants will be working in skilled occupations which are more highly paid. Finally, 
there are significant benefits to New Zealand in being able to target migration towards areas of 
labour shortage.  
3 Ensuring success of the scheme 
For the scheme to be a success, however, there needs to be consideration of the tension 
identified by the Australian review of the KANI which exists between ensuring that the scheme has 
development benefits for migrants and PICT communities, and the cost implications for New 
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Zealand. A labour-training migration scheme has a high cost, especially in comparison to the PAC 
and the RSE schemes. These costs can be offset to some extent by having migrants contribute to the 
workforce in areas of skill shortage in New Zealand after they complete their training, which will 
simultaneously reduce population pressures and increase remittances for communities of origin. 
However, there are competing concerns: such schemes run the risk of reducing the adaptive capacity 
of PICT communities through the "brain drain" that may be effected by enabling high-achieving 
school leavers to emigrate, and there would also be adaptation benefits to PICT communities if 
migrants return after completing their training and contribute to the health sector in the Pacific 
Islands. 
There are a number of options for achieving an acceptable balance between the cost burden and 
adaptive benefits. It may be that a scheme would only be financially viable if trainees were under a 
contractual obligation to work for a set period in New Zealand after graduation. It may also be the 
case that in order to effectively counter skill shortages in New Zealand, migrants will need to be 
encouraged or required to live and work in smaller urban centres, rather than in the major cities. It 
should be noted, though, that migrants will be more likely to settle successfully in larger urban 
centres, where community support networks are already established.  
In order to maximise the adaptive benefits for communities, and to try and avoid the negative 
effects of the loss of human capital, there could be a condition on participants who remain in New 
Zealand to return to their countries of origin periodically and volunteer their skills. However, studies 
of the KANI suggest that a strict requirement may not be necessary – participants felt it was 
important that they return as regularly as possible, contribute their skills and send money back to 
their home communities.178 
In order to ensure the scheme works successfully as a migration pathway, it should also provide 
greater job-seeking and residency support than the Australian scheme does. The programme should 
provide the option for trainees to be given a work placement once they have completed their studies, 
rather than leaving them to seek their own jobs, as is required under the Australian model. This will 
provide greater security for participants in the programme, who may find job seeking in the New 
Zealand market difficult, despite having earned the requisite qualifications. The scheme should also 
provide an automatic granting of residency to participants once they have completed their training 
(if they wish to stay in New Zealand), rather than requiring them to find work before this is 
provided. Again, this would offer migrants security and certainty, and reflect a commitment on New 
Zealand's behalf for the scheme to work not only as a training scheme, but also as a migration 
pathway. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
It is clear that international law provides insufficient protection to the millions of people 
worldwide who are likely to be displaced by the impacts of climate change. This is of particular 
concern to New Zealand. The Pacific Region is one of the most vulnerable in the world to the 
effects of climate change and is likely to experience high levels of out-migration. As a result, New 
Zealand will face increasing migration pressure from neighbouring PICTs as the situation nears 
crisis point.  
A New Zealand policy response is required to address this concern of mounting migration 
pressures and the risk of a possible humanitarian disaster in the Pacific. This article has argued that 
the most effective way of achieving this is through pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes which 
facilitate movement between PICTs and New Zealand. Possible measures discussed include 
extending the Pacific Access Category and the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme, as well as 
introducing labour-training migration schemes.  
These initiatives allow migration to be used as a tool of adaptation for migrants and their 
communities, and allow for New Zealand to plan and manage migration, which will not be possible 
if migration occurs during a full-scale humanitarian crisis. These schemes will help to ensure that 
where relocation is necessary, Pacific peoples will be able to migrate with dignity. 
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